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Abstract
Systematized Thinking. The Philosophy of Páll Skúlason in Light of
Habermas
It is characteristic of the late Páll Skúlason’s writings that he was preoccupied
with threepartite distinctions that served to systematize his philosophical
thought. I show that these distinctions are both ontological, methodological
and axiological. I focus in on the axiological distinctions and argue that they are
subsumed under a more fundamental distinction between the three main tasks of
human life which are based on the human needs for survial, understanding and
interaction. These distinctions are fleshed out and explained and it is asked how
Skúlason’s philosophical anthropology can help us deal with the contemporary
human predicament. These ideas are compared and contrasted with Habermas’s
systematic thought, in particular his distinction between three types of cognitive
interests and particularly the concomitant distinction between different types
of rationality. I argue that while there are many similarities in Skúlason’s and
Habermas’s systems of thought, they also reveal totally different views on the
role of philosophy and the possibilities of moral reasoning. The similiarities res-
ide mainly in their common emphasis on salvaging the Aristotelian distinctions
between poiesis and praxis, and beween technological and practical rationality.
The main difference is that Skúlason employes a substantial notion of pract-
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