Hugur - 01.06.2011, Qupperneq 58

56
Eyja Margrét Brynjarsdóttir
Abstract
Looking at nature when looking at nature
According to a prominent ontological view, a thing is what it is because of its
nature. But as we all know, ‘nature’ is a word of many meanings. It can refer to
something like the aspect of our surroundings that is not man-made, which is
what we have in mind when we speak of natural science, also known as empirical
science. It can also refer to something like a thing’s essence. My purpose in this
paper is to consider to what extent empirical data can be useful for deriving onto-
logical results. More specifkally, I consider two distinct cases. On the one hand,
I consider whether data from experimental psychology on crossmodal perception
can yield information useful for getting at conclusions about the nature of spatial
and sensory properties.This is relevant to issues concerning the so-called Moly-
neux’s question, originally posed late in the iyth century to John Locke. A salient
question to ask here is whether an empirical answer to Molyneux’s question
tells us anything about the underlying spatial properties. On the other hand, I
consider whether psychological data on people’s behavior and attitudes regarding
money and other economic phenomena tell us anything about the ontology of
money and financial value.